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Abstract 
Democracies do not take up arms against each other. This axiom has attained the status of a mantra 
in the field of international relations. As previous research has shown, however, the truth of this 
statement is highly contingent on the definitions of both democracy and conflict. Based on this 
fact, this project has two aims: one empirical and one theoretical. Empirically, it revises this 
literature, making three substantial improvements: 1) it uses a more robust and transparent 
measure of democracy (V-DEM); 2) it does not rely on arbitrary cut points between democratic 
and non-democratic regimes; and 3) it combines the theoretical perspectives of similarity-based 
and normative views on the reasons behind the peace among regimes. These methodological 
improvements allow us to generate a new theory of democratic peace, which complements both 
similarity-based and institutional arguments. We find robust evidence that the higher a dyad’s level 
of democracy, and the smaller the difference between the democratic scores of its members 
(‘democratic spread’), the lower the probability of war (and also militarized interstate disputes, 
MID) between that pair of states. Thus, not only is the core principle of the democratic peace 
revealed to be strong enough to withstand different measures of democracy, but it also offers an 
alternative explanation of conflict.   
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1. Introduction 
The idea of democratic peace can be traced to the writings of Immanuel Kant, who in 1795 
postulated that in a world of constitutional republics there would be no room for war (Gleditsch 
1992; Brown 1999). Thomas Paine (1776) and Alexis de Tocqueville (1835-1840) also defended 
republics and democracies by stressing their lower propensity to war. However, it was not until 
the second half of the twentieth century that these ideas gained empirical traction from the path-
breaking developments made by Babst (1964), Rummel (1983), and Doyle (1986). The 
combination of these ideas, hypotheses, and tests is collectively known as the theory of democratic 
peace.  
 Although diverse empirical tests confirm that wars (or military conflicts) between 
democracies are extremely rare—to the point of being almost nonexistent (Gleditsch 1992; Maoz 
and Russett 1993; Gartzke 1998; Russett and Oneal 2001; Levy 2002)—a further caveat regards 
the views of Paine and de Tocqueville: it is not that democracies do not go to war (they do); rather, 
they rarely go to war against each other (Bremer 1992; Dixon 1994; Lake 1992). In other words, 
democratic dyads have a lower probability of experiencing militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) 
than other types of dyads.1 Consequently, and contrary to the assertions of Kant, the contemporary 
theory of democratic peace maintains that democracies are less likely to go to war with other 
democracies (Chan 1984; Maoz and Abdolali 1989). In fact, they go to war about as often as 
undemocratic states--just not with each other (Gartzke 1998; Ray 2003).2 Empirically, evidence 
supporting the existence of a democratic peace is so convincing that Jack Levy has claimed that 
the absence of war between democracies is the closest thing to an empirical law that exists in 
international relations (Levy 1989: 270).3  
 Despite the robustness of this literature, we claim that it suffers from two major flaws. 
First, despite being one of the most empirically tested theories in international relations—and in 
the discipline of political science as a whole—virtually every such test has relied the same measure 
of democracy (Polity). Second, even if we assume for the moment that the concept of democracy 
is fully captured by this measure, almost all studies set an arbitrary cut point to distinguish between 
democracies and non-democracies without further justification as to why this particular point was 
                     
1  There are also monadic versions of this theory, such as Pickering (2002) or Ishiyama et al. (2008). However, 
they are usually not as relevant to the literature as the dyadic arguments.  
2  For a discussion on Kantean peace, what Kant meant, and what he did and did not write, see Oneal and 
Russett (2015).  
3  Likewise, Russett sustains that the democratic peace is “one of the strongest nontrivial and nontautological 
generalizations that can be made about international relations” (1990: 123).  
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chosen along the authoritarian-democratic continuum (e.g. “0.5”).4 Yet without a theoretical 
reason for this choice, it is not inherently obvious where one group ends and the other begins.   
 This research not only makes a further step toward testing the democratic peace theory 
using a novel and a more robust measure of democracy (which is a contribution per se), but it also 
tests how far this theory travels without setting an arbitrary cut point between democracies and 
non-democracies. This allows us to go one-step further and build new theoretical arguments about 
this relationship. This is a crucial test because, as democracy has been mainly operationalized using 
a single indicator, the observed “democratic peace” might be an artifact of a flawed measure rather 
than an actual relationship among democracies. Indeed, the literature is well aware of the fact that 
the way democracy or war are operationalized “can play a decisive role in the testing of falsifiable 
hypotheses” (Bernhard et al. 2017).5 Therefore, by measuring the independent variable differently 
we should be able to reject this alternative hypothesis.  
 Conventionally, previous research into this area has examined the likelihood that two 
countries will go to war with each other based on their respective levels of democracy. The basic 
hypothesis posits that if any two countries were above a certain democratic cut point, their 
probability of going to war would be close to zero. Unlike previous studies that set an arbitrary cut 
point between democratic and non-democratic regimes, working outside a dichotomous frameset 
allows our theory to better capture the mixed or hybrid reality of many regimes and thereby test 
the elasticity of the theory. In other words, we examine how well this theory travels along the 
democratic continuum, not only in terms of a dyad’s absolute level of democracy, but also in 
relation to the democratic divide between states, which refers to the absolute difference between 
the level of democracy of each member of a given dyad.  
 
2. Causal Mechanisms within Democratic Peace 
The democratic peace is probably the most discussed theory in the field of international relations. 
Popularly, the theory of democratic peace is usually synthesized in the following statement: 
democracies do not fight each other. There are two major causal explanations for the relationship between 
democracy and peace. The ‘cultural-normative’ mechanism (Russett and Oneal 2001) argues that 
                     
4  See Bogaards (2012) for a discussion about the use of arbitrary cut point to differentiate democracies from 
other type of regimes. Actually, Bogaards identifies no less than 18 different ways of using Polity to classify 
democracies.  
5  See also Mansfield (1988) in terms of how different definitions of war affect the democratic peace literature. 
Also, these definitions become acutely important when extending the historical breath of the research, as 
contemporary definitions of democracy are extremely demanding.  
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democratic societies are inherently reluctant to go to war because: 1) citizens do not vote to send 
themselves to war; and 2) democracies share the basic principle of peaceful conflict resolution, 
which extends to their relationships with other countries (Levy 2002: 359). This mechanism has 
been strongly criticized (Rosato 2003) and is slowly falling into disuse, being replaced by an 
institutional (and not normative) version.  
The institutional version of the democratic peace is based on ‘institutional constraints’ 
(Levy 2002: ibid) and emphasizes structural elements rather than rules. Such elements include: the 
formal and informal vetoes that may exist, the checks and balances between the powers of the 
State, and, more generally, the dispersion of power and the role of the free press. According to 
this model, decision makers are constrained by the need for popular support, dispersed in various 
government institutions (Russett 1994: 38). Recently, Hegre et al. (Forthcoming) have developed 
new tests that refine the mechanisms of institutional constraint, differentiating between those that 
are formally vertical (elections), informal (civil society activism), and horizontal (the constraints 
that other branches place on the Executive).  
Given its prominence within the field, the theory of democratic peace has been challenged 
on numerous counts. On the one hand, it has been argued that the causal relationship between the 
two is spurious (Rosato 2003; Mousseau 2009, 2013), driven instead by international institutions, 
geographic distance, political and military alliances, economic interdependence, political stability 
or state capacity (Russett 1994). On the other hand, a stronger criticism holds that it is not 
democracy that causes peace, but the similarity between regimes (Raknerud and Hegre 1997; 
Gartzke 1998, 2000; Werner 2000; Peceny et al. 2002; Lektzian and Souva 2009). This reasoning 
assumes that those regimes that are similar to each other in terms of their democratic level have a 
lower probability of conflict than mixed dyads, which applies to both the subset of democratic 
states as well as the subset of autocratic states.  
The similarity argument derives from the fact that democratic states do not fight each 
other, but that does not mean they do not fight other types of states.6 In this way, both Gleditsch 
& Hegre (1997) and Raknerud & Hegre (1997) hypothesize that the probability of war in a mixed 
dyad must be greater than the probability in a similar dyad, be it democratic or autocratic. Likewise, 
Werner (2000) argues that similar states are less likely to enter into conflict than disparate states, 
testing this view with an analysis of the survival of peace duration in similar and mixed dyads. 
                     
6  As suggested by Blaney (2001), democracies co-exist only very uneasily with non-democratic regimes. From 
his view, democracies are intolerant with autocracies, and therefore “troublemakers.” This is because 
democracies usually sanction autocracies, denounce violations of basic human rights, etc. On this point, see 
also Barkawi and Laffey (1999).  
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Their results show that politically akin dyads are more likely to enjoy a lasting peaceful relationship 
over time, even controlling for the democratic character of those states. The dyads of democratic 
states remain the most peaceful, but even the dyads of autocratic states are notably more peaceful 
than mixed dyads.  
Gartzke (1998, 2000) explores a parallel argument, hypothesizing that it is the similarity of 
states’ preferences that causes peace, and not the democratic character of those states. In his words: 
“If similar regime type leads to similar preferences, then we have not to ‘democratic peace’ so 
much a ‘regime type similarity peace’” (Gartzke 1998: 11). After his analysis, the author concludes 
that much of what has been described as ‘democratic peace’ can be explained by the similarity of 
national preferences between states. Peceny et al. (2002) disaggregate the category of autocracies 
into several subsets and argue that the similarity in the type of autocracy presents a lower 
probability of conflict compared to mixed dyads, but higher than in the case of democratic dyads. 
After constructing a theoretical model based on political similarity, geographical distance and 
economic interdependence, Henderson (2002) is also strongly critical of the theory of democratic 
peace. In a synthetic way, he maintains that democratic peace is only a statistical artifact, which 
disappears when these other variables are taken into account. Following a similar intuition, Bennett 
(2006) tests a multinomial logit model that classifies states into democratic, autocratic or mixed 
dyads. Taking the mixed dyads as a base category, the result confirms that the autocratic dyads 
have a 35% lower chance of conflict and the democratic dyads a 55% lower chance of conflict. 
However, if only wars are considered, which represent the highest level of militarized conflict, the 
effect dilutes: democratic dyads have 82% less chance of going to war than autocratic dyads. A 
different line of argument follows Lektzian & Souva (2009), who explore the consequences of a 
‘regime-similarity peace’ for the different versions of the theory of democratic peace. 
Conversely, the cultural-normative mechanism of the theory of democratic peace assumes 
that there is something inherently different in the relations between democratic states that are not 
present in the relationship between autocratic states, which have very different institutional 
constraints. For this reason, it can hardly be complemented with arguments such as regime 
similarity. In the words of Letzkian & Souva:  
if there is a broader regime-similarity peace, then the theory of the democratic peace 
based on similar institutions leading to a shared set of preferences for international 
outcomes would have significant excess empirical content over established theories of 
the democratic peace based on information or norms (2009: 17).  
 
 7 
3. Explaining the Rationale of the Interactive Model of 
Democratic Peace  
Despite their many differences, the institutional constraints explanation and the ‘similarity-based 
peace’ (also known as isomorphic peace) are complementary in several respects. The perspectives 
are not the same: democratic peace holds that institutional constraints that reduce the likelihood 
of conflict are found only in democracies, while autocratic peace holds that they can also be present 
in autocratic states. Nonetheless, their causal logic is not entirely opposed, as in the case of the 
cultural-normative mechanism. The autocratic peace argument, in its ‘soft’ version, tries to explain 
why autocratic dyads have a lower probability of conflict than mixed dyads, an empirical fact that 
has already been observed by the theorists of democratic peace (Bremer 1992; Hewitt and 
Wilkenfeld 1996). Authors in this tradition argue that institutional constraints are not unique to 
democratic states, but are also present (to some degree) in a wide range of autocracies. Checks and 
balances, veto players and the need to mobilize popular support are also present in many 
autocracies—a fact that underscores the need to exercise caution when operationalizing 
‘democracy.’   
Based on the complementary characters of the cultural-normative perspective 
(democracies do not fight each other because they have a distinctive character) and the similarity-
based view (similar regimes do not fight each other because of shared interests), Figure 1 depicts 
an interactive effect between both mechanisms. This figure illustrates every possible dyad based 
on each country’s democratic level and the democratic difference within each dyad.  
Figure 1 shows four hypothetical dyads of countries (a, b, c, d), along two axes: the 
democratic level of the dyad and its democratic spread. The dyad “a” has a combined level of 
democracy of 0.9 due to the democratic scores of its members (|1.0|-|0.8|); the spread—or 
absolute difference between the democratic scores of both members—is 0.2 (|1.0|-|0.8|). 
Likewise, dyad “b” has a democratic mean of 0.15 and a spread of 0.1 given by the values of each 
country (|0.1|-|0.2|). Dyad “c” has a democratic level of 0.675 and a spread of 0.4. Finally, dyad 
“d” has the broadest spread of these examples of (0.7) due to its member values (|0.05|-|0.75|) 
and a combined democratic mean of 0.4.  
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Figure 1. Dyad’s Democratic Mean and Spread 
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Whether because it is of its high democratic level or its minimal democratic spread, virtually 
all students of the democratic peace—regardless of their theoretical stand—will agree that dyad 
“a” is one with the lowest probability of conflict. In dyad “b”, both members are clearly non-
democratic, which means that the likelihood of conflict should be larger than in dyad “a,” at least 
from an institutionalist perspective. From a similarity-based view, the members of this dyad are 
even more similar than those in dyad “a” (spreada > spreadb), therefore the probability of conflict 
should be even lower than in “a.” Dyad “d” is certainly the most conflict-prone group of all, as it 
is composed of a democratic regime and an unambiguously authoritarian regime, with a large 
concomitant difference. Of course, these are simple examples for the sake of explanation; for any 
given democratic level, there are an infinite number of dyadic pairs whose spreads will differ.  
Theoretically speaking, the dyad with the broadest possible spread is the pairing in which 
one member has a democratic score of one, while the other has a score of zero. By definition, this 
dyad cannot have a combined democratic average of anything other than 0.5. Thus, there is a dyadic 
triangle—drawn by the dashed lines—that circumscribes the arena where all potential imaginable 
dyads can be found. (Please note that this triangle refers to the characteristics of the dyad, not 
countries forming the dyad.)  
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Building on the graphical description of dyad means and spreads in Figure 1, Figure 2 
represents the expected regions of peace and conflict based on the literature discussed above. 
Figure 2a depicts the expectation of the original idea that democracies do not fight each other, 
following Singer & Small (1974). Thus, the circle in the upper left shows the anticipated region of 
peace based on the institutionalist perspective (dyads composed of quite similar and highly 
democratic countries). Figure 2b, however, sketches the similarity-based view. There is a peace 
zone concentrated vertically at the left of the dyadic triangle, encompassing those regimes that are 
notably similar (very low spread) in terms of their democratic level, regardless of the absolute value 
of the level itself. At the far right of the dyadic triangle, there is a region of conflict, which by 
definition involves extremely different regimes.  
Thinking of this orthogonal space delimited by the democratic mean and spread of each 
dyad is congruent with a certain part of the literature, but differs in the evident avoidance of a clear 
cut-off point between democracies and non-democracies. This is a major departure from all the 
aforementioned approaches. Working with pairs of binary variables (i.e. democracy vs. non-
democracy), outcomes are logically restricted to a 2×2 matrix, which limits possible combinations 
and other types of relationships. Working with a continuous measurement of democracy has the 
benefit of being able to identify variation in the effect along the democratic continuum, without 
theoretically presupposing it in advance. Also, it opens the door to the possibility that the effect 
of the level of democracy varies conditionally by the democratic spread of both countries or vice 
versa, without ruling out in advance the potential existence of causal heterogeneity. This allows us 
to better approach certain cases that are part of the ‘gray area’ in which defining a regime as 
democratic or non-democratic is difficult.  
Taking advantage of continuous measurements of democracy, we agree that there is an 
uneasy relationship between democracies and autocracies. Democracies use a diverse range of 
tools to (sometimes forcibly) democratize autocracies. Contrary to the similarity-based perspective, 
we find the argument of shared interests among autocracies to be unpersuasive. Of course, that is 
not to say that autocracies do not have internal institutional constraints—they clearly do 
(Castiglioni 2001; Gandhi 2008)—but the creation of a common external enemy is old as time 
itself.  
Thus, using Figure 1 as a hypotheses generator, we expect that the lower a dyad’s average level 
of democracy and larger its democratic spread, the higher the probability of a war between its component states. This 
is to say, we expect wars to occur close to the lower side of the triangle previously described, in 
what we term the “risk region.” Likewise, the mirror image of the hypothesis, the higher a dyad’s level 
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of democracy and smaller its democratic spread, the lower the probability of a war between its component states, 
leads us to anticipate a “zone of peace.” Both zones are depicted in Figure 2c. Our theory is heir 
of the “peace scale for State relationships” elaborated by Goertz et al. (2016: 27). They suggest 
three groups of indicators that produce three categories: Rivalry, Negative peace, and Positive 
Peace, respectively.  
Obviously, the fact that a dyad is located close to the lower side of the triangle, within the 
risk region, is not sufficient for a war to occur. Indeed, many thousands of countries in that region 
coexist peacefully without ever exhibiting even the slightest signal of aggression toward one 
another (e.g. Cuba and Nepal in 1980). Therefore, we cannot forget that we are working with a 
probabilistic hypothesis. Likewise, the fact that a dyad is located outside the risk zone does not 
mean that the probability of a war is zero; in reality, some wars clearly occur beyond the risk region 
(e.g. Poland-Lithuania in 1920 or Turkey-Cyprus 1974, etc.). Although a couple of cases in a 
universe of several hundred thousand cases do not invalidate a theory (King et al. 1994), they do 
compel a more detailed and nuanced elaboration. In due time we will tackle the cases outside the 
risk region previously mentioned.  
 
Figure 2. Theories of the Democratic Peace based on Dyad’s Democratic Mean and 
Spread 
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4. Research Design: Variables and Methods 
Dependent variable: War 
It is abundantly clear that the different ways in which conflict is operationalized have a clear impact 
on any study of the democratic peace. Different definitions result in the inclusion or exclusion of 
particular cases, thereby altering the results. Moreover, even agreeing on what constitutes 
‘democracy’ and ‘war’ may prove controversial. For example: “By Doyle’s definition, Spain only 
became a liberal regime in 1978, but Lake’s article, making use of the Polity II data set, codes Spain 
as democratic in 1898” (Spiro 1994: 60). He adds: “because the literature on democracy and war 
is highly empirical, it is important to remember that the subjective judgments by which variables 
are coded in data sets have significant and important effects on the results yielded by analysis of 
those data” (Spiro 1994: 62).  
Because war is (thankfully) a rare occurrence, the literature testing the democratic peace 
theory has mostly used MIDs as a dependent variable, which includes a greater range of conflict 
than just war (Bremer et al. 1972; Jones et al. 1996). These are situations  
in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one-member state is 
explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, 
property, or territory of another state. Disputes are composed of incidents that range in 
intensity from threats to use force to actual combat short of war (Jones et al. 1996, 168).  
In addition to full-blown war, MIDs also include threats, signs of force, and more limited use of 
force. It is worth noting that the term ‘militarized interstate dispute’ only applies to conflicts 
between internationally recognized sovereign states; therefore, conflicts within countries (e.g. Syria 
at present), colonial wars (Algeria v. France), or armed conflicts involving non-state actors (FARC 
v. Colombian State) are excluded from the analysis. From this perspective, war is a subset of MIDs. 
The concept of war commonly refers to the use of lethal violence, institutionally organized, and 
on a large scale (Russett 1994: 12). 
While previous works—e.g. Maoz (1999), Gartzke (2000), Bennett (2006), Lektzian and 
Souva (2009), Gartzke & Weisiger (2013)—have coded MIDs in a ‘broader sense’ [ where 1 is a 
dispute and 0 is the absence of a dispute], we use a more restrictive codification in which 1 is a war 
and 0 otherwise.7 Our choice is based on Goertz (2017), who tackles one of the major discussions 
                     
7  Overall, 99.9% of the dyads are coded as 0, and 0.1% as 1, totaling 583 dyads at war between 1900 and 2000. 
The data is retrieved from the Correlates of War project, and our variable is a transformation of the ordinal 
variables HostlevA and HostlevB: (1) No militarized action; (2) threat to use force; (3) display use of force; (4) 
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of this literature:  
Using the example of the democratic peace, one needs to go back to the main dependent 
variable under consideration: Is it “war” or “peace”? The dependent variable in virtually 
all large-N statistical studies is militarized interstate disputes (aka MIDs). This means that 
peace is conceptualized as “not-MID.” This is problematic: for example, the USA and 
North Korea have not been at peace for most years since 1955, but rather they have been 
in a state of not-MID.  
The sufficient condition version of the democratic peace—the most popular one—is 
problematic exactly because of the problematic conceptualization of peace as not-war. The 
sufficient condition version in practice is explaining “not-war” or “not-MID.” This is a 
heterogeneous category. In many studies, “peace” includes (1) years of peace between the 
USA and Canada, (2) years of not-MID between serious rivals such as India–Pakistan or 
the USA–USSR, and (3) years of no interaction such as Chile–Cameroon (see Goertz, 
Diehl, and Balas 2016 for a discussion of the concept of peace). Arguably, the causal 
mechanisms producing these three “not-MID” zero cases are quite different. In contrast, 
the necessary condition version focuses on the dependent variable of militarized disputes 
and wars (2017: 112). 
We use two ordinal variables from Correlates of War that include several degrees of MIDs to test 
the robustness of our findings. The first of them is comprised of the five categories in HostlevA 
and HostlevB, and the second variable is a 22-point scale that provides a more complex grading of 
conflicts. Table 1 expresses the codification of the three different operationalization of the 
dependent variable we consider.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
use of force; and (5) war. Our dummy for wars only considers, then, category (5) as a positive outcome. Out 
of the 606,056 dyads that the dataset has for the period 1900-2000, 99.38% correspond to category (1), 0.2% 
to category (2), 1.1% to category (3), 3.9% to category (4) and 0.1% to category (5). This totals 583 wars out 
of 606,056 observations. 
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Table 1: Codification of the Dependent Variable 
Type of conflict 
dependent 
variable 
robustness check 
1: MID (a) 
robustness check 
2: MID (b) 
No militarized action 0 1 0 
Threat to use force 0 2 1 
Threat to blockade 0 2 2 
Threat to occupy 
territory 0 2 3 
Threat to declare war 0 2 4 
Threat to use CBR 
weapons 0 2 5 
Threat to join war 0 2 6 
Show of force 0 3 7 
Alert 0 3 8 
Nuclear alert 0 3 9 
Mobilization  0 3 10 
Fortify border 0 3 11 
Border violation 0 3 12 
Blockade 0 4 13 
Occupation of territory 0 4 14 
Seizure 0 4 15 
Attack 0 4 16 
Clash 0 4 17 
Declaration of war 0 4 18 
Use of CBR weapons 0 5 19 
Begin interstate war 1 5 20 
Join interstate war 1 5 21 
Source: Correlates of War. 
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Independent Variables: Dyadic Democratic Mean and Spread 
The vast majority of recent studies on democratic peace use Polity as an indicator of democracy.8 
This measure is in itself quite problematic (Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Coppedge et al. 2011). 
This is due to two reasons: 1) Values must be accepted at face value (since they cannot be 
replicated), but also 2) Because it is an ordinal variable that is routinely treated as continuous.9 Of 
course, we are well aware that until very recently Polity was the only truly cross-national and 
longitudinal database available to researchers; a situation that has drastically changed since the 
release of V-DEM’s database.10 
V-DEM’s data are compiled by experts in each country, through questions with well-
defined response categories or scales of measurement. Ideally, at least five experts contribute to 
each indicator for each country-year. This means that more than 2,600 experts in total have 
participated in the data collection. At the same time, the individual expert scores are aggregated 
using a Bayesian IRT model, which produces an estimate of the latent variable for each indicator 
(Coppedge et al. 2017). Likewise, its continuous nature (the variable ranges from 0 to 1) does not 
assume a fixed boundary between democracy and non-democracy, taking into account the 
variations in the effect depending on the value that the independent variable takes. In this way, the 
non-linearity proposed by the logit models is used (Long 1997; Agresti 2007). 
The electoral democracy index used here (v2x_polyarchy) is the basis for all indices of 
democracy developed by V-DEM. It takes as reference the concept of polyarchy developed by 
Dahl (1971, 1989). This variable is understood as a core element of any other conception of 
representative democracy: liberal, participative, deliberative, egalitarian or other (Coppedge et al. 
2016a). The index is formed taking the average of: 1) The weighted average of the indexes that 
measure freedom of association, suffrage, free elections, elected executive, and freedom of 
expression; and 2) The multiplicative interaction between these five indices.  
Based on V-DEM’s polyarchy index, we calculate the democratic mean and democratic 
spread for each dyad-year between 1900 and 2000. Democratic Mean refers to the average of both 
member of the dyad polyarchy measures, and Democratic Spread is determined by the absolute 
difference between the democratic values of each member of the dyad. Democratic Spread is 
                     
8  Previous studies also used dichotomous indicators of democracy and non-democracy (Babst 1964; Doyle 
1986).  
9  On the problems of using discrete indicators as if they were continuous, see Long and Freese (2006).  
10  For an overview of V-DEM see Coppedge et al (2011), and for further details on the construction of high 
level indices using V-DEM data, see Coppedge et al (2016b).  
 15 
therefore a direct heir of the dyadic difference measure proposed by Gartzke & Weisiger (2013) based 
on Polity. The interplay of these two variables creates a set of finite possibilities which we define 
as the dyadic triangle, as described in Figure 1.11 (See Figure A1 at the online appendix for a graphical 
distribution of these variables for all our observations.) 
 
Control Variables 
The control variables included in our model follow the relevant literature, and correspond to 
potential alternative explanations for the relationship between democracy and conflict. 
• Geographical distance and contiguity. It is based on the assumption that neighboring countries 
are more likely to experience conflict than distant countries. This is measured through two 
variables: a) Contiguity, which takes value of 1 when they are contiguous and 0 when they 
are not; and (b) Distance, which is the natural logarithm of the number of miles between 
the two capital cities in the dyad.12 Incorporating distance allows for the differentiation 
between the effect of proximity and preferences (Hensel 2000; Senese 2005). 
• Alliance. It is based on the assumption that the existence of an alliance has an effect on the 
likelihood of conflict. This variable dummy codes the presence of a defense pact, neutrality 
pact or entente in the dyad as 1, and the absence of these pacts as 0, using the Alliances 
database of the Correlates of War project (Singer and Small 1966; Small and Singer 1969; 
Gibler 2008).  
• Proportion of material capacities. It is based on the assumption that material capabilities 
determine the ability of States to carry out an armed conflict. This is typically measured 
using the Composite Index of National Capabilities, or simply CINC (Singer 1988). This 
index incorporates an average of six indicators: military spending, military personnel, 
energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban population, and population size (as 
a proportion of world’s population). In turn, the proportion of material capacities used 
here measures the sum of the CINC in the dyad, expressed as a percentage. 
• Great power. It is based on the assumption that the great powers have a greater probability 
                     
11  If one observes the evolution of the polyarchy means and spread between 1900 and 2000, it is clear that both 
variables are correlated in time and that after 1989, when the Cold War ended, the average polyarchy score 
has increased while the difference has remained unchanged, showing that there has been a democratization 
wave. This same trend is observable in 1945, 1919 and 1901 (see Figure A2 at the appendix). 
12  Or nearest major cities, in the case of some large countries. 
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of conflict than the non-powers. The Great Power variable is coded as 1 if at least one of 
the States in the dyad is a power and 0 if no State in the dyad is a power, according to the 
criteria followed by Correlates of War (Singer 1988).  
• Trade interdependence. In order to include one of the main alternative explanations for 
democratic peace, studies typically include a measure trade dependence for each dyad, 
which results from the sum of the dependence of both countries on trade. This variable 
has a large amount of missing values (the periods of 1914-1919, 1939-1945 and 1993-2000), 
so the literature usually includes it only as a robustness check (Gartzke and Weisiger 2013). 
We create one variable using the trade dependence variable as suggested by Oneal & 
Russett (1997) and discussed by Barbieri and Peters (2003) that we name trade interdependence, 
which measures the average trade interdependence growth rate in the dyad, expressed as a 
percentage. 
• Time autocorrelation. There are three ways to address time dependence in binary data: one 
could use splines or time dummies, both of which are addressed by Beck, Katz, and Tucker 
(1998), or include t, t2, and t3 in the regression, as suggested by Carter and Signorino (2010). 
We opted for the latter alternative, as it is much easier to implement than splines and avoids 
the problem of quasi-complete separation of time dummies.  
 
5. Statistical Analyses 
The democratic peace theory has been refuted and resurrected many times in recent years due to 
measurement decisions and methodological misspecifications (Gartzke 2007; Dafoe 2011; Dafoe 
et al. 2013; Mousseau 2013). Two main objections have been raised to the causal inference: peace 
may cause democracy, or some other societal factors may cause both democracy and peace (Hegre 
2014: 163). Because our contribution is to test an alternative measure of democracy, which we 
believe has many advantages over previous studies, our control variables are those most frequently 
found in the literature. We do not dig, for instance, in the democratic peace-capitalist peace debate, 
which would require an extensive array of economic variables. We aim to offer a model as 
parsimonious as possible to explore the interplay between democratic mean and democratic spread 
in country dyads. After we run several robustness checks, we proceed to a discussion on which 
threshold of democratic mean/spread is a necessary condition to achieve peace, ceteris paribus, 
and discuss a few enlightening cases as suggested by Levy and Goertz (2007).  
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Our universe of analysis is constituted by approximately 365,000 observations. Although 
democratic mean and democratic spread  have around 480,000 observations each, trade exhibits 365,000 
observations. Our models remain notably robust even without including the variable trade.  
Our baseline model can be specified as  
 
Pr(War)i,t =  β0 + β1DemMeani,t +  β2DemSpreadi,t + β3Contiguityi
+ β4(log) Distancei + β5Alliancei,t + β6CINCi,t + β7GreatPoweri,t
+ β8TradeInterdependencei,t + β9…11TimeAutocorrelationi,t 
 
Where subscript 𝑖 denotes the dyad and 𝑡 the year. We include standard errors clustered 
by dyad.  
As seen in Table 2, Model 1 uses a logit model with a dichotomous indicator of war as the 
dependent variable. We then use the ordinal MID variables, first the five-category variable and 
then the 21-category variable (see Table 1) in Models 2 and 3, respectively. Our main interest is in 
the interplay between dyad democratic spread and dyad democratic mean. Results are notably robust across 
all models and according to our expectations. Democratic mean is negatively associated to the 
probability of war occurrence, while spread is positively so. Of all the controls included in the 
specifications, only the inclusion of a major power in a dyad did is statistically discernable from 
zero in all models. Contiguity also is not statistically different from zero in Model 1, the logit 
model.13   
                     
13  We performed the correction for the occurrence of rare events (rare events) as proposed by King & Zeng 
(2001). As stated by King & Zeng (2001), when working with binary dependent variables that have many 
‘zeros’ and very few ‘ones'’there is a risk that the probability of occurrence of the event will be 
underestimated. For this, the authors propose a correction of the bias produced in the estimation. Knowing 
the probability of ‘ones’ that there is in the pobado this bias can be corrected by means of the method of 
prior correction. The results do not differ substantially from those reported in the model 1 (see Table A in 
the appendix). 
(1) 
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Table 2: War and MIDs  
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3)    
Dependent variable: war 
 
MID (a) 
 
MID (b)    
Model: Logit 
 
Ordered 
logit 
 
Ordered 
logit 
Democratic Mean 0.958**  0.982***  0.982*** 
 (-2.61)  (-6.15)  (-6.11) 
Democratic Spread  1.030***  1.019***  1.018*** 
 
(3.79)  (9.76)  (9.82) 
Trade interdependence 0.947** 
 
0.946*** 
 
0.946*** 
 
(-3.01) 
 
(-4.55) 
 
(-4.65)    
Contiguity 2.228 
 
17.02*** 
 
16.16*** 
 
(1.24) 
 
(20.47) 
 
(20.17)    
Distance (log) 0.715** 
 
0.848*** 
 
0.843*** 
 
(-2.98) 
 
(-10.86) 
 
(-11.11)    
Material Capabilities 599.9*** 
 
23495.6*** 
 
20235.9*** 
 
(3.48) 
 
(13.61) 
 
(13.69)    
Alliance 0.111*** 
 
0.597*** 
 
0.601*** 
 
(-4.55) 
 
(-5.49) 
 
(-5.40)    
One is a Major Power 0.941 
 
1.089 
 
1.091    
 
(-0.11) 
 
(0.65) 
 
(0.66)    
t 1.482 
 
0.978 
 
0.981    
 
(0.62) 
 
(-0.58) 
 
(-0.51)    
t2 0.995 
 
1.001 
 
1.001    
 
(-0.47) 
 
(1.89) 
 
(1.80)    
t3 1.000 
 
1.000** 
 
1.000**  
 
(0.29) 
 
(-2.89) 
 
(-2.80)    
AIC 2594.6  16907.1  20006.6    
Pseudo R2 0.173 
 
0.249 
 
0.219    
%CP 99%  52%  48% 
N 303800  303800  303800    
Coefficients expressed as odds ratios; Standard errors clustered in dyads t 
statistics in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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At this point, the reader will ask why there is not an interaction term between our two 
crucial independent variables, democratic mean and democratic spread. The discussion about the 
need to incorporate interaction terms in logit models is still an open one. There are authors who 
argue that it is not necessary to incorporate it since it is present by definition in this type of model 
(Berry et al. 2010). On the contrary, there are also authors who have recently argued in favor of 
their inclusion (Rainey 2016). In this case we do not include it, following Berry et al. (2010), who 
see interactions as a result of compression.14  
To interpret the interaction, we created a figure of the predicted probabilities in all the 
possible combinations of our two variables of interest, keeping all other variables at mean levels 
(see Figure 3). We are offer a heuristic aid based on the probabilities of war, which overwhelmingly 
supports our theoretical expectation represented graphically in Figure 2c. Combining the 
probabilities estimated and the empirical distribution of cases, it is evident that the risk zone is 
constituted by the trapezoid along the lower bound of the triangle formed by democratic spread 
and democratic mean.  
 
Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities of War from Model 1 
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14  “Compression is present in a logit or probit model because as Pr(Y) approaches its limits of 1 and 0, even 
powerful causal variables cannot increase/decrease the probability of an event beyond the upper/lower limit 
that probabilities can assume” (2010: 254).  
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The figure above combines the probabilities of war based on Model 1 with real examples 
of wars using exemplary cases.15 For a complete view of the distribution of all dyads and all 
dyads at war, see Figure A3 in the appendix.16 We illustrate the probability of war: the lighter the 
color, the higher the probability of war. We have also indicated select examples of war using a 
star, which represents the dyad location in both crucial dimensions explained above (democratic 
mean and democratic spread). For a better understanding of this figure, we also include the 
democratic level of each country belonging to the selected cases. As hypothesized, there is a risk 
area (area under the lower bound) and a peace zone (above the upper bound), which can serve as 
rules to predict war among states.  
Of all dyads in the analysis, the dyad with the broadest democratic spread was during the 
Gulf War between France and Iraq in 1991. To the contrary, the dyad with the highest democratic 
mean that went to war is that of Poland and Lithuania in 1920 (well outside the risk zone), and the 
one with the lowest democratic mean of them all is the dyad composed of Italy and Ethiopia in 
1936.  
As explained from the beginning of this research, we explicitly avoid setting a cut point 
between democracies and non-democracies. Nonetheless, a view of the very few cases that fall 
well beyond the risk zone (such as the Polish-Lithuanian war of 1920, or the Turkish-Cypriot 
conflict of 1974, the two dyads with the highest democratic means) seem to be an explicit challenge 
to the democratic peace theory. We contest this interpretation. Being outside the risk zone does 
not necessarily imply that the members of these dyads should be considered “democratic,” at least 
in the fullest, most meaningful sense of the term.  
If we use the classification of regimes proposed by Lührmann et al. (2017), which are based 
on Lindberg (2016), of the two dyads under consideration, Poland was the only liberal democracy 
of all four participating countries. In fact, Lührmann et al (2017) consider Lithuania in 1920 to 
                     
15  For a careless reader, the predicted probabilities presented here might seem low. Nevertheless, they have 
similar levels compared to some of the main works in the literature (Russett 1994; Russett and Oneal 2001; 
Gartzke and Weisiger 2013; Weisiger and Gartzke 2016). Since wars are infrequent events in history, the 
probability of war or conflict for a given dyad will always be relatively low.  
16  Unlike other studies in the literature, we have considered all dyads in the international system. Although we 
agree that some dyads have a much lower probability of militarized conflict, the selection of ‘relevant dyads’ 
involves arbitrary decisions without a solid theoretical base. Braumoeller & Carson (2011) are critical of 
controlling for the political relevance of the dyad, arguing that it eliminates much of the likelihood of conflict, 
and, for the reasons they state, our work considers all dyads, including those that, due to their distance from 
each other and their material capacities, have a low (or null) probability of conflict among themselves. This 
issue has been addressed by Beck et al. (2000) and also King & Zeng (2001), who address the statistical 
implications of including or not including these observations. Since part of the literature has used politically 
relevant dyads to test the democratic peace theory, we run Models 8, 9 and 10 for this subset. See Table B in 
the Appendix. 
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have been an electoral autocracy, and in 1919—when Poland captured Vilnius—a closed 
autocracy, despite the fact that in 1920 it had a polyarchy score of 0.59 with a confidence interval 
oscillating between 0.54 to 0.64.  
The conflict between Turkey and Cyprus is less confusing, at least when we consider 
dichotomous measures of democracy. Despite the fact that according to Lührmann et al. (2017) 
neither country was a liberal democracy in 1974, they did satisfy the criteria for electoral 
democracies. Nonetheless, following other measures of democracy—particularly those that set a 
group of necessary conditions, such as those of Cheibub et al. (2010), Haber and Menaldo (2011), 
Boix et al. (2013)—Cyprus does not qualify as a democracy in 1974, but Turkey does.  
It is crucial to notice that there is no case of a war in any dyad whose democratic level is 
above 0.61 using the V-DEM polyarchy score. Of course, as V-DEM’s measurement model is 
based on Bayesian item response theory (IRT) modeling techniques to estimate the latent 
characteristics of its collection of expert ratings (Pemstein et al. 2015), it should not be a surprise 
that some dyads change their democratic scores for the same year in different versions of the data. 
In other words, the measurement model is constantly readjusting itself once new waves of data 
come in. Moreover, because the values for each dyad are set relative to all other dyads, one cannot 
use a value as a threshold but could theorize a certain decile.  
Based on our theoretical framework and empirical models, we infer a heuristic that 
recognizes three large regions of political regimes in relation to the level and democratic spread of 
any dyad. On the one hand, any pair of countries located at or below the lower quartile [defined 
by the formula y = 0.5x + 0.25], has a substantially greater probability of going to war. As expected, 
a dyad in the risk area is 40 times more likely to go to war than a dyad that is outside this region. 
At the same time, while the peace triangle has not predictive power over the probability of war, it 
has a strong effect on MIDs (dyads in the zone of peace see their probabilities of MID cut in half). 
On the other hand, we identify a zone of peace that includes pairs of countries located at 
or above the sixth decile [defined by the formula y = 0.5x + 0.60]. The three resulting areas can be 
clearly identified in Figure 3 with dotted lines. This rule should be independent of readjustments 
of the values in V-DEM data. At the time we did this research, there was no empirical case or war 
falling on or above this line.  
This heuristic rule is in harmony with previous theoretical works, such as Goertz et al. 
(2016: 27) when they suggest a “peace scale for State relationships.” As mentioned, they propose 
three areas of dyadic conflict, named Rivalry, Negative Peace, and Positive Peace, respectively. The 
difference here is that while they reach their models through a theoretical analysis, we conduct an 
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inductive, data-driven analysis. Nevertheless, their elaboration perfectly overlaps with our findings: 
Rivalry materialized in our Risk-Region, Positive Peace is equivalent to our Peace Zone, and 
Negative Peace is represented as the area in between the Peace Zone and Risk-Region. 
Thus, proposing a risk area and a zone of peace hypothesis, we test the following model:  
 
Pr(War)i,t =  β0 + β1PeaceZonei,t +  β2RiskAreai,t + β3Contiguityi
+ β4(log) Distancei + β5Alliancei,t + β6CINCi,t + β7GreatPoweri,t
+ β8TradeInterdependencei,t + β9…11TimeAutocorrelationi,t 
 
As expected, a dyad in the risk area is 40 times more likely to go to war than a dyad that is 
outside this region (see Model 1). At the same time, while the peace triangle has not predictive 
power over the probability of war, it has a strong effect on MIDs (dyads in the zone of peace see 
their probabilities of MID cut to a half).  
 
(2) 
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Table 3: Zones of Peace and Risk 
 (4)  (5)  (6)    
Dependent variable: war  MID (a)  MID (b)    
Model: Logit  
Ordered 
logit  
Ordered 
logit 
Risk Area 40.71***  1.77***  1.76*** 
 (3.65)  (3.63)  (3.64) 
Peace Zone 0.28  0.50***  0.50*** 
 (-1.70)  (-3.83)  (-3.79) 
Trade 
interdependence 0.957**  0.967***  0.966*** 
 (-3.00)  (-3.36)  (-3.52)    
Contiguity 4.472  20.18***  19.22*** 
 (1.56)  (21.43)  (20.88)    
Distance (log) 0.796  0.879**  0.875** 
 (-1.85)  (-2.89)  (-3.06)    
Material Capabilities 709.7  49769***  42050*** 
 (1.44)  (6.19)  (6.33)    
Alliance 0.12***  0.61***  0.61*** 
 (-3.71)  (-6.14)  (-6.05)    
One is a major power 1.281  1.134  1.136    
 (0.37)  (0.94)  (0.96)    
t 1.134  1.002  1.003    
 (0.67)  (0.05)  (0.09)    
t2 1.000  1.001  1.001    
 (-0.13)  (1.39)  (1.34)    
t3 1.000  1.000*  1.000*   
 (-0.51)  (-2.50)  (-2.43)    
AIC 2719.9  18660.6  22023.9    
Pseudo R2 0.182  0.243  0.214    
%CP 99%  52%  48% 
N 364507  364507  364507    
Coefficients expressed as odds ratios; Standard errors clustered in 
dyads t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Conclusions  
This study suggests, once again, that the premises of democratic peace are strong enough even to 
withstand radically different measures of democracy. These results are also solid enough to survive 
alternative ways of operationalizing the dependent variable (war/MID). Democracies do not fight 
each other, although this does not mean they are necessarily less warlike.  
Despite the fact that the democratic peace is probably one of the most revisited theories 
in international relations, practically all previous studies are based on a single measure of 
democracy: Polity. Thus, the main objective of this work has been to reconsider this theory using 
a new, stronger, and more robust measure of democracy, V-DEM’s polyarchy index. 
Working with a truly continuous measure of polyarchy, this document provides a finer 
evaluation of the supposedly peaceful behavior of those regimes located in the upper zone of the 
polyarchy index. Likewise, we manage to avoid using the sort of predetermined, arbitrary 
distinction between democracies and non-democracies that is a common pitfall in the literature on 
the subject.  
In doing so, we propose an Interactive Model of Democratic Peace that suggests there is an 
interplay between the democratic mean and democratic spread of the dyads. This interplay creates 
a triangle of possible outcomes that we call the dyadic triangle. From this model, we derive that the 
pattern of democratic peace, an empirical law for some colleagues, works differently from what 
has been predicted by the traditional or the similarity-based views.  
Using the interplay between the dyads’ mean and spread of democracy, we were able to 
theoretically and empirically derive three heuristic zones, filling much of the gray-area that has 
been left unexplained by previous models. Although our model is the first to explore these two 
dimensions interactively, the Interactive Model still has to keep updating itself (as democracy scores 
update yearly), filling the blanks (as there is missing data), and moving forward to incorporate more 
and more dyads characteristics.  
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Figure A1: Kernel density of democratic level and spread 
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Figure A2: Democratic mean and spread in time 
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(a)All dyads in the system (b)All wars in the system 
 
 
Figure A3: Distribution of all dyads in the system and all dyads at war based on dyad’s 
democratic level and spread  
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Robustness Checks 
 
Table A: Robustness check A – Rare Events Logit 
 
(7)    
Dependent variable: war 
Model: Rare Events Logit 
Democratic Mean 0.959**  
 
(-2.69)    
Democratic Spread  1.030**  
 
(3.14)    
Trade interdependence 0.864*** 
 
(-9.32)    
Contiguity 2.429    
 
(0.80)    
Distance (log) 0.722*   
 
(-2.39)    
Material Capabilities 661.7    
 
(1.36)    
Alliance 0.120*** 
 
(-3.68)    
One is a major power 0.947    
 
(-0.08)    
t 1.454    
 
(0.73)    
t2 0.995    
 
(-0.54)    
t3 1.000    
 
(0.31)    
N 303800    
Coefficients expressed as odds ratios; Standard errors 
clustered in dyads. t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** 
p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table B: Robustness check B – Politically relevant dyads 
 
(8) 
 
(9) 
 
(10)    
Dependent variable: war 
 
MID (a) 
 
MID (b)    
Model: Logit 
 
Ordered 
logit 
 
Ordered 
logit 
Democratic Mean 0.945* 
 
0.981*** 
 
0.981*** 
 
(-2.36) 
 
(-4.02) 
 
(-4.02)    
Democratic Spread  1.038** 
 
1.021*** 
 
1.021*** 
 
(2.59) 
 
(5.39) 
 
(5.37)    
Trade interdependence 0.963** 
 
0.960** 
 
0.960**  
 
(-2.63) 
 
(-2.95) 
 
(-3.04)    
Contiguity 8.287** 
 
17.75*** 
 
15.86*** 
 
(2.69) 
 
(7.05) 
 
(6.94)    
Distance (log) 1.134 
 
1.049 
 
1.037    
 
(1.02) 
 
(0.82) 
 
(0.63)    
Material Capabilities 0.0716 
 
79.62** 
 
73.93**  
 
(-0.89) 
 
(3.25) 
 
(3.23)    
Alliance 0.119*** 
 
0.528** 
 
0.529**  
 
(-3.78) 
 
(-3.17) 
 
(-3.16)    
One is a major power 0.276* 
 
0.562** 
 
0.562**  
 
(-2.56) 
 
(-2.95) 
 
(-2.94)    
t 1.222 
 
0.963 
 
0.966    
 
(0.68) 
 
(-1.21) 
 
(-1.13)    
t2 0.998 
 
1.001* 
 
1.001*   
 
(-0.44) 
 
(2.26) 
 
(2.17)    
t3 1.000 
 
1.000** 
 
1.000**  
 
(0.16) 
 
(-2.92) 
 
(-2.84)    
AIC 
Pseudo R2 
1346.0 
0.149 
 
11182.6 
0.137 
 
13759.5    
0.113    
%CP 99%  52%  46% 
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N 32997  32997  32997    
Coefficients expressed as odds ratios; Standard errors clustered in 
dyads; t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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